the application of formal notations to analyse accident reports has shown that the quality of these accident reports is poor, so much so that their conclusions can be misleading. The proposed solution has been to use formal notations in combination with traditional analysis to produce a report, the conclusions of which can be veri ed by formal reasoning. However, there are weaknesses with the formal notations used up until now. Firstly, t h e y h a ve not allowed the representation of all aspects of an accident o r i n c i d e n t. In particular, human factors have either not been represented or not clearly delineated from system factors. In particular, there has not been an attempt to provide a task analysis of the incident. It will be shown how s u c h a task analysis can be provided within a formal model. The advantages of this approach will be explained. Secondly, the notations used do not easily facilitate the system engineering concepts of modularity, encapsulation, or scalability. In consequence it is di cult to model di erent aspects of an accident, compose these di erent aspects to build up the model, or make c hanges to parts of the model without a ecting the rest of the model. This paper explains how the most mature of the formal objectoriented speci cation languages, Object-Z, can remedy these problems. An air accident i n vestigation report, issued by the Civil Aviation Authority, is used as a case-study.
Introduction

The problems with accident reports
Accident reports tend to belong documents containing a mass of data of varying degrees of relevance to the actual incident under consideration. Typically, an accident report will contain: a synopsis, a conclusion, and a body. The purpose of the conclusion is to explain the major causes of the incident and provide recommendations so as to avoid similar incidents in the future. The conclusions are claimed to be based on the body of the report. However, there are several problems with making such an assumption. The body consists of sections which tend to be written by di erent teams of experts. This often leads to inconsistencies. To ascertain all the available details of a particular event or state of the system it may benecessary to read through di erent sections of the report. Even if the report possesses adequate referencing it can still be an arduous task to glean the needed information.
Accident Reports are often incomplete. It has long been known that, in the eld of Software Engineering, speci cations of systems described using natural language often contain ambiguities and inconsistencies. They can also be incomplete. In an analogous way this is also true of accident reports. Given that the bodyofan accident report may contain such problems, the conclusions of the report can be erroneous or misleading.
Recent w ork(C.W. Johnson & A.J.Telford 1996 , Johnson 1997 has shown that formal notations can beused in conjunction with traditional analysis to provide a better quality report. Building formal models of an accident can be used in helping to verify that: the main body of the report is unambiguous, consistent, and complete. the conclusions logically follow from the main body of the report. The formal notations that have been employed(C.W. Johnson & A.J.Telford 1996 , Johnson 1997 have b e e n v ersions (temporal in some cases) of predicate calculus.
Predicate calculus only possesses constructs for reasoning but not for structuring a model. Notations without structuring capabilities do not easily facilitate: the modelling of di erent aspects in isolation, the composition of these di erent aspects to build up the model, the possibility of making changes to parts of the model without a ecting the rest of the model. The fact that di erent aspects of an incident are not easily distinguished in such models would, in particular, imply that the modelling of users is not easily distinguished from that of the system. In the analysis of an incident this would be an important distinction to make if a true understanding is to be gained.
Furthermore, in the analysis of human factors, it often provides insight to build a task analysis model. B.Kirwan & L.K.Ainsworth (1992) de ne task analysis as the study of what an operator ( or team of operators) is required to do, in terms of actions and/or cognitive processes, to achieve a system goal. This analysis can becarried out separately from the analysis of the system and the two compared for incompatibilities. The information given by a task analysis will be structured. For example, a particular task may bedescribed in terms of sub-tasks which may in turn be described in terms of sub-tasks. Building a model in a notation without the potential for such structuring would neither be easy, nor would the result be particularly legible. Thus a notation describing a task analysis should naturally provide structure. None of the previous work used such a notation, nor did they provide a task analysis model. The structuring facilities of the notation used in this paper will allow the building of a task analysis model.
The case-study.
The case-study concerns an aircraft incident which took place near Daventry. The aircraft was a Boeing 737-400, G-OBMM. Soon after take-o , from East Midlands airport, it was noted that guages indicating the oil pressures and oil quantities were low and decreasing. It was decided to bring the plane down. Once on the ground it was noticed that the cowls of bothengines, and the underside of both wings and aps immediately behind the engines were covered in engine oil.
The aircraft had been scheduled to undergo borescope inspections of the turbine sections of both engines during maintenance of the previous night. This was usually performed by the Line Maintenance shift. The Line Engineer, in charge of this shift, realised that they were understa ed that night. As he was the only Line Maintenance Engineer with the necessary authorisation he began to prepare one engine (engine no.1) for inspection. When he was ready he went o ver to the Base Maintenance hangar to ask for the borescope equipment a s w ell as someone to assist him. The high pressure (HP) spool of the engine needed to be turned by a second person whilst he did the inspection. The Base Maintenance Controller was also quali ed to do borescope inspections, but was in danger of allowing this authorisation to lapse. British Midland required sta to perform a minimum of two borescope inspections per year in order to keep their company authorisation. The Base Maintenance Controller was also aware that Line Maintenance was understa ed, and therefore o ered to take o ver supervision of the borescope inspections if the Line Maintenance engineer could supervise the moving of a Boeing 737-500. This o er was accepted. Although he had not carried out a borescope inspection for some time the Base Maintenance Controller did not make use of the task cards available.
There are three main stages to a borescope inspection of an engine: the preparation, the inspection itself, and the reassembly. Although the preparation and inspection were conducted as expected, the reassembly of the engines was not. Several tasks were omitted, the two high pressure(HP) rotor drive c o vers, one on each engine, as well as the corresponding O-rings, were not re tted, and an idle test run of the engines was not carried out. The entry relating to borescope inspections in the technical log was signed as being completed.
2 Existing Accident Analysis Techniques.
Fault Trees.
Fault tree analysis is widely used in the aerospace, electronics, and nuclear industries (Leveson 1986) , for analysing the causes of hazards. It uses boolean logic to describe the combinations of individual faults that can constitute a hazardous event. For the purposes of accident analysis the semantics of fault trees have to be adjusted, however, the basic tree structure still remains the same. Tree nodes represent events or non-events such as tter omits to put back O-ring'. It is a top-down method, the top event stating the result of the incident, whilst each l e v el down describes the events in more and more detail. A simpli ed fault tree of the Daventry incident i s given in Figure 1 .
The most serious weakness with fault trees is that they do not explicitly show the event sequence. Simple AND and OR gates do not convey any notion of time ordering or time delay. It will often bethecase that events will be interleaved time-wise, instead of in sequence, at any one level. Adding other types of gates to the syntax to help solve this problem only reduces the tractability o f t h e technique, which i s o n e of its major assets. Another weakness of fault tree analysis is that it does not provide for modularity, even the use of the extended technique of hierarchical fault tree analysis still provides only a very limited form of modularity. Finally, fault trees do not separate human from system factors. Cause-Consequence Analysis starts with a critical event and determines the causes of the event and the consequences that could result from it. The symbols available to the technique include the logic gates AND and OR, and in fact the causes can be given by fault trees. A cause-consequence diagram of the Daventry incident is given in Figure 2 . Separate diagrams will berequired for each critical event, and there may beseveral di erent causes of a critical event.
Unlike fault trees cause-consequence diagrams show the sequence of events explicitly. However, diagrams can become di cult to read. Again, there is no distinction made between human and system observations, and there is no way t o i n tegrate human factor techniques such as task analysis. The two techniques discussed above are graphical. Neither provides the possibility of reasoning about the particular incident. Predicate logic can be used both to represent and reason about the events that lead up to major accidents(C.W. Johnson & A.J.Telford 1996 , Johnson 1997 . In the Daventry incident the simple fact that oil leakage will occur if the O-ring or HP rotor drive c o ver is not replaced after the inspection of the turbine of engine no.1 can be expressed by:
YES
: replace(engine1 O ring) _ : replace(engine1 HP rd cover) ) oil leakage (engine1) Many s u c h logic statements can be written to describe the incident, and combining these with the axioms of predicate logic, reasoning can be carried out to prove or disprove assertions concerning the incident.
In conclusion, graphical notations such as fault trees and cause-consequence diagrams can quickly become intractable as more and more events are represented, and thus lose there main advantage over textual notations. For the same reason it would not besensible to build a large model using the predicate calculus. What is needed is an engineering approach: a method which includes the concepts of encapsulation and composition so that di erent aspects can be built up in isolation and then composed in a structured way. None of the techniques discussed in this section distinguish easily between human and system factors. Neither would it beeasy to integrate a task analysis of the incident.
3 Choosing a notation.
The well established formal speci cation languages Z(Dillar 95) and VDM-SL (Jones 1990 ) provide means of building more structured models which still possess all the reasoning power of the predicate calculus. However, these languages still do not o er some of the more powerful structuring capabilities associated with object oriented notations. Due to this weakness, formal speci cation languages have been developed, such as Object-Z(Duke, King, Rose & Smith 1991), MooZ and VDM++ which are object-oriented in nature but are based on either Z or VDM. Object-Z is the most mature of these notations (Lano & Haughton 1994) and it was therefore chosen to avoid the weaknesses inherent in previous notations used for accident analysis.
Object-Z is an extension of the formal speci cation language Z which a ccommodates object orientation. The main reason for this extension is to improve the clarity of large speci cations through enhanced structuring (Duke et al. 1991) . A t ypical Z speci cation consists of an unorganised collection of state and operation schemata. An example of a Z operation schema is given below. There is, however, no explicit statement of which state schema this operation schema applies. A large speci cation, containing many s u c h operation as well as state schemata, is likely to become unmanageable. Push (items) item? : Item #items < max items 0 = hitem?i a items
The introduction of classes means that relevant operation schemata can begrouped with a particular state schema, allowing for a more structured and readable speci cation. Each class can beconsidered in isolation from the rest of the speci cation. Furthermore, complex classes can be speci ed in terms of simpler classes through the structuring techniques of inheritance and instantiation.
The philosophy encouraged by an object oriented approach is di erent from that of speci cation languages such as Z, as it leads to a stronger focus upon partitioning of a speci cation into well-designed and encapsulated subsystems (Lano & Haughton 1994) . The syntax for Object-Z can be found in Appendix A. The remainder of this paper focuses on the application of this notation. 4 Introducing the model: Encapsulation and Composition.
In this section the sta ng situation given in the case-study is represented in Object-Z. The Sta ng situation can beconsidered in isolation from other aspects of the incident s u c h a s t h e borescope inspection or the state of the plane. In other words, the properties of the sta ng situation can be encapsulated within an Object-Z class. For example the fact that the Line Maintenance shift is understa ed can be represented in one class while the procedural aspects of the borescope inspection can beencapsulated in another class. Furthermore, simple classes can be composed to form more complex classes, so a class representing the complete sta ng situation can be built from smaller classes representing, for example, the Line Maintenance sta ng and the Base Maintenance sta ng.
Encapsulating properties of a supervisor.
The rst thing which is usually done in writing an Object-Z speci cation, before any classes are de ned, is to identify the basic sets which are needed. In the case of the sta ng situation it will be assumed that there is a set Personnel \However, when he came back into work, at about 1930 hrs on the Wednesday evening, he found that the manpower of the shift had not been supplemented. Instead of the nominal shift complement of six, there were only four on duty that night, two of whom, including the shift leader, were doing extra nights to cover shortfalls."(D.F. King 1996) 4.3 Composition of sta ng classes.
The class BM sta ng is similar to the class LM sta ng and is therefore not given here. The two classes LM sta ng, a n d BM sta ng can be used to build a class which represents the complete night sta ng situation. 4.4 Using the model to describe alternative scenarios.
The class LM sta ng has been de ned in a general way. That is to say the state de nes variables which a l l o w the modelling of situations other than the one found in the Daventry scenario. In the above de nition, these variables have been initialised to take their corresponding values found in the Daventry report. To a l l o w for di erent scenarios, the initialisation values could be altered. For example, if the accident w as to be avoided, the initialisation of the class LM sta ng should have been:
INIT supervisor:person = LM manager no of sta = 6 manpower status = OK 5 Introduction of tasks to the model. The Daventry report often refers to tasks and procedures that the supervisors need to carry out: \So, he (the Base Maintenance Controller) o ered to take over the borescope inspections personally if the Line Maintenance Engineer could take over the moving of the (Boeing) 737-500 from the Ramp to Base. This o er was accepted and the transfer of the task was noted, . . . " (D.F. King 1996) Thus it seems appropriate to represent t h e tasks (or actions) that a supervisor is expected or required to carry out, including how these tasks are related or structured. The eld of task analysis (Diaper 1989, B. Kirwan & L.K.Ainsworth 1992) has many techniques for providing such representations. One general method is that of hierarchical task analysis (HTA). This technique includes the concepts of goals, sub-goals, tasks, and plans. This section will show h o w Object-Z can be used to represent H T A. However, the Object-Z model will not stick strictly to the approach of HTA. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, i t is often di cult to di erentiate between tasks and goals in the Daventry report. Secondly, task analysis notations, such as HTA, provide means of reasoning about expected user behaviour. They do not model erroneous behaviour. This clearly raises problems if we want to model the ways in which the omission of a task can lead to an accident.
Describing tasks by means of a class.
To introduce the concept of tasks, a new basic set Task name is assumed to contain the names of those tasks which can be carried out.
Task name]
A new class Tasks can now be de ned. One important e v ent described in the Daventry scenario, and quoted above, was the transfer of tasks between the Line Maintenance Engineer and the Base Maintenance Controller. Given that a class Tasks possesses a set of tasks it would seem appropriate to have operations which can add or remove tasks from this set. The class BM sta ng could be initialised so that the Base Maintenance Controller's initial tasks included move 737 500. Application of the appropriate operations of the sub-class Tasks would then describe the event g i v en diagrammatically in Figure 3 . The last two sections have given an indication of how a model of the sta ng situation can bebuilt up using the concepts of encapsulation and composition, and has also introduced a simple model of the task situation. The next sections extend the idea of the task model by looking at the borescope inspection procedure. This can be considered in isolation from the sta ng situation. Ultimately the top class of the sta ng situation and the top class of the borescope inspection procedure can becombined into one main class. This again shows the power of Object-Z for building large scale models of complex human and system failures.
6 Developing the task analysis model: Modularity.
The last section considered how a simple class Tasks could be used to model the interchange of tasks between the`users' involved in the Daventry incident. Consideration of the task situation with regards to the borescope inspection is also relevant to an understanding of the accident. Indeed some of the theory of task analysis is particularly appropriate to this aspect of the Daventry incident. The borescope procedure is described in Section 1.6.4 of the accident report. This is not shown here for reasons of brevity. A simpli ed version of the borescope procedure is given in Figure 4 . The justi cations for incorporating a task model within the Object-Z model rather than making use of HTA model will be discussed in this section. 6.1 The borescope inspection procedure.
The borescope inspection procedure is split into three sections: preparation of the engine, conducting of the inspection, and reassembly of the engine, which suggests there should bethree corresponding classes. To show how task analysis can be developed in Object-Z, the reassembly section will rst beconsidered in isolation. A class representing reassembly is given below. The operations of the class correspond to the tasks given in Section 1. This may, at rst, appear to be a complex and long-winded description. However, it is evident that this class contains a great deal more information than the corresponding section of the HTA diagram. This level of detail will be needed in any serious analysis of an accident.
The state variable engine is of class type Engine. Engine possesses such state variables as O rings status, HP rd status, e t c . The class BI reassembly includes operations which describe what actions are taken corresponding to the tasks named above. Given the extra level of detail, analysis of task sequences can be carried out. In particular, the body of the operation Perform engine run states that if the O-rings are not tted or the HP rotor drive c o ver is not replaced then an oil leak will occur.
As it stands the operations can be carried out in any order, whereas the borescope inspection procedure implies an order in which the tasks are carried out. A class Tasks has been de ned, in Section 5, which described a set of tasks which a supervisor needed to perform, whereas here there needs to be some order given to these tasks. For example, running the engines before the rotor drive c o vers are re tted is clearly not the same as running the engine after they are re tted. To this end a c l a s s Plan will be de ned, but rst, so that this class can incorporate the notion of the omission of a task, a more general discussion on tasks and human errors is given.
Tasks and Errors.
Operators make mistakes. Such errors as omissions of necessary tasks and commissions of unwarranted tasks are included in Hollnagel's classi cation of human errors (Hollnagel 1993) . In the Daventry incident the borescope inspection procedure is not followed. Some tasks are omitted. Moreover, Lucy Suchman says that the circumstances of our actions are never fully anticipated and are continuously changing around us (Suchman 1987) . Task Analysis notations, typically, provide little means of modelling these adjustments to plans. Instead, it will be shown how Object-Z can be used to represent changes to a plan as well as the scenarios implicit in an HTA diagram. This work will build on the previous use of CSP to model human error scenarios(P.C.Wright, R.E. 6.3 Adjusting the class Tasks.
The class Plan given below is a modi ed version of the class Tasks. It contains a state variable tasklist, which is of type: a sequence of task names. The current task is given by the variable current task. The operation next task removes the head of the sequence tasklist. This is carried out when the current task has beenperformed. The next task in the sequence then becomes the new current t a s k . There is also an operation omit a task which allows the explicit representation of a task being omitted, and an operation add a task which models commission. Operations which model other errors given in Hollnagel's classi cation (Hollnagel 1993) The task Plan can be included in the class BI reassembly so that the variable task list now names the tasks to be carried out in some speci ed order. The operations of BI reassembly should then be applied in a corresponding order. To be able to state this constraint a pre-condition is added to each operation so that it can only be applied if it matches up with the task name given by current task. For example, the operation Re t new Orings can only be applied if the pre-condition that current task = re t new Orings is satis ed. If the task is carried out, the sub-operation next task will update the task list by removing the task name re t new Orings. current task then takes on the value of the next task name in the list, which in this case would be re t HP rd cover. An operation can now be considered as describing a task at two levels: at the human factors level there is the task name, and at the software engineering level this is made more precise by giving pre-and post-conditions to de ne the e ects of carrying out the task.
The inclusion of the class Plan means that operations such a s omit a task are available to the class BI reassembly. As was said in Subsection 6.1 if either of the reassembly sub-tasks: re tting the O-rings or replacing the HP rotor drive cover, is omitted then carrying out the sub-task of performing an engine run will result in an oil leak. In the case of the Daventry incident none of the three reassembly sub-tasks are carried out. So the sequence of operations representing this scenario will include: omit a task(re t new Orings) omit a task(re t HP rd cover) omit a task (perform engine run) This will leave the engine state with neither the O-rings tted nor the HP rotor drive c o ver on. The fact that the engine run has not been performed implies that an oil leak will occur when the plane is in ight.
In general, not all combinations of relevant class operations and the omission operation can occur. Whether a particular scenario can occur will depend on the pre-conditions, other than those stating the task name. A simple example is that of the operation Re t new Orings which can only beapplied if engine:O rings status = un tted. Thus, pre-conditions could be added to relevant operations of the model to stop certain unwanted scenarios occurring. Given these pre-conditions, the system -that the model represents -could then be considered to see if it could be re-designed to match the new model. In the case of the Daventry incident a required precondition of an operation Fly plane should be that the HP rotor drive c o vers have been re tted. The procedures should beso designed so as to ensure that this pre-condition will be satis ed. For example, the carrying out of the operation Perform engine run would guarantee this. So a recommendation of the accident report should be that this task be made a priority.
7 Hierarchy of tasks: Scalability.
In the last section a class BI reassembly was described. Similar classes, BI preparation and BI conduct, representing the other sub-tasks in the borescope inspection, can bedescribed. Similarly to Section 4, the above classes could becombined to form a larger class BI procedure . The tasks relevant to this larger class will be at the top level of the hierarchy. In BI procedure the task list will contain the task names bi preparation, bi conduct, and bi reassembly. Again there should be a relationship between the operations of the class and the task names given in the task list. In the class BI reassembly this relationship was an isomorphism. However, it is not quite so simple if we w ant t o model the omission of a task. One simple de nition of, for example, the operation Reassemble BI is: The complete scenario of how the borescope inspections were carried out by the night maintenance sta can now be analysed by considering the relevant sequence of operations. The model also allows the analysis of other scenarios, the consequences of which m a y also bepotentially disastrous. If changes to the system were considered desirable operations could be adjusted so as to analyse these changes.
The borescope inspection procedure modelled here has only two levels in its hierarchy of tasks. However, it can easily beseen that having more hierarchical task levels could be modelled using the technique described above.
8 Conclusion.
Previous work has shown that the use of formal notations in combination with traditional analysis can improve the quality of accident reports. However, there were several weaknesses in these notations. This paper has shown that Object-Z can remedy some of these weaknesses. Object-Z, through encapsulation and composition, provides the mechanisms for structuring a model. Encapsulation allows di erent aspects to be modelled separately, whilst composition implies that classes can be built-up from smaller classes. It is also suggested that the speci cations are much more readable. Present work aims to provide empirical validation for this claim. A further advantage is that small changes to the speci cation will only a ect the immediate class or classes involved. Lastly, it has been shown how a simple task analysis representation can be incorporated within a system model. This allows direct consideration of the consequences of operator actions.
The task model described here only considers the case when the task plans are simple sequences this is not generally the case. A more typical plan may include repetition, choice, and concurrency. Ongoing work has shown that these constructs could be modelled by extending the Object-Z approach given here. However, application of the approach to a simple example produced a result which was complex and di cult to read. Even so it may still be worthwhile to use in safety-critical cases. An alternative notation, a combination of CSP and VDM-SL, is o ered in R.E. Fields et al. (1995) , but is not applied to a large example.
Another strength of the Object-Z model is that it allows consideration of scenarios other than that which occurred in the Daventry incident. This implies that other similar potential errors may bedetected. Furthermore, the speci cation can beadjusted so as to consider the consequences of redesigning the system so as to avoid such errors.
A The syntax of Object-Z.
Syntactically, a class of Object-Z is a named box with zero or more generic parameters. The constituents of the class may include inherited classes, type and constant de nitions, at most one state schema, at most one initial state schema, zero or more operation schemata, and an optional history invariant. These constituents can beseen in classes de ned in the sections of the paper. For instance, the class LM sta ng of Section 4 contains, in the order given, a type de nition, a state schema consisting of state and an initial state schema which is identi ed by the word INIT. The -list of an operation, see class Tasks in Section 5, lists those variables of the state whose values may change when the operation is applied. Operations can also begiven in terms of other operations using a non-boxed format. State variables and constants are known collectively as attributes. Instances of a class are called objects. A class can be used as a type. Thus, if C is a class, the declaration c : C declares the object c to be of class C . If a is an attribute and Op an operation both de ned in C then c:a denotes the attribute a of object c and c:Op corresponds to the application of operation Op on c. The use of the dot operator can be seen in the class LM sta ng. Other operators speci c to Object-Z are introduced in the body of the paper as the case arises.
